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INTRODUCTION 
The instant case involves a situation of off duty misconduct by a law 
enforcement officer, a termination of employment, and a claim by that law enforcement 
officer for unemployment insurance benefits. Where the Court draws the line in a case 
of a law enforcement officer between off duty misconduct that is "in connection with 
employment" and off duty misconduct that is not "in connection with employment" 
will have implications for all law enforcement officers in the State of Utah. The 
Court's decision will also have implications for all public employees in the State of 
Utah and many private employees in the State of Utah. Thus, this case has far reaching 
ramifications for employees in positions which involve any public presence and any 
contact with the general public. 
The issue in the instant case is not whether the Department of Public 
Safety should or should not have discharged Mr. Fieeiki. The issue is whether the 
Department of Public Safety's evidence as to why it to discharged Mr. Fieeiki satisfies 
the three elements of the just cause standard, Utah Code Annotated § 35A-4-405 (2) 
(a), Utah Administrative Code R994-405-202 (2001), so as to deprive him of eligibility 
for unemployment insurance benefits. Those three elements are knowledge, control 
and culpability. 
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This case concerns primarily the third element of the just cause standard; 
namely, culpability-were Mr. Fieeiki's off duty, off site, in the middle of the night, 
within the privacy of his own home, actions so "connected" to his employment and so 
"bad" that he brought about his own discharge and should not be rewarded with 
unemployment insurance benefits?; or, were his actions, while meriting some discipline 
or perhaps even a discharge, not connected enough to his employment and not harmful 
enough to his employer's rightful interests to deny him eligibility for unemployment 
insurance benefits? See Utah Administrative Rule 994-405-202 (1). 
In the instant case, the Workforce Appeals Board argues that the 
Department of Public Safety's evidence met its burden to establish the three elements 
of a just cause discharge, including the element of culpability. Thus, the Workforce 
Appeals Board argues that the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact are 
supported by substantial evidence. And the Board also argues that the Administrative 
Law Judge's application of the law to the facts was correct and was not an abuse of 
discretion. 
On the other hand, the Claimant, employee Stan Fieeiki, contends that the 
Administrative Law Judge's factual findings on the issue of whether Mr. Fieeiki's 
actions on the night in question were "in connection with employment" are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Mr. Fieeiki also contends that the Administrative 
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Law Judge's application of the law of culpability to the facts was an abuse of 
discretion. Thus, Mr. Fieeiki submits that the Court should not uphold the Board's 
findings, conclusions or decision but reverse the decision and award unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
The issues of fact included such issues as what exactly happened on the 
night in question, what did Mr. Fieeiki's wife do to provoke Mr. Fieeiki and whether 
Mr. Fieeiki was acting in self defense. Those are issues of fact subject to the highly 
deferential standard of review. Mr. Fieeiki does not seriously challenge the 
Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact as to what happened on the night in 
question. He does question the Administrative Law Judge's findings of fact as to the 
connection between his off duty, off site actions and his employment -whether Mr. 
Fieeiki's actions exposed the Department of Public Safety to any real harm of any kind. 
ARGUMENT 
Mr. Fieeiki agrees with the Board and court precedent that to challenge a 
finding of fact a claimant must marshal the evidence in favor of the finding in dispute 
and then demonstrate how that finding, when viewed in light of the whole record 
before the Court, is nevertheless not supported by substantial evidence. See Grace 
Drilling v. Board of Review. 776 P.2cd 63, 67-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), Kennecottv. 
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Utah State Tax Commission. 858 P.2d 1381, 1385 (Utah 1993) and the discussion in 
Point III of the Board's brief in opposition. 
The Board correctly articulates the requirement of marshaling but 
misapplies it in the instant case. The question of whether the facts satisfied the just 
cause standard is not a question of fact; it is a conclusion of law. 
Thus, what Mr. Fieeiki primarily disagrees with is the Board's 
methodology-its effort to apply the requirement of marshaling to the legal conclusion 
that the Department of Public Safety's evidence established that Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
were culpable and, therefore, that the Department satisfied the just cause standard. 
POINT I. THE EMPLOYER'S EVIDENCE AS TO 
CULPABILITY WAS LACKING AND THE BOARD'S FINDINGS AS, 
TO CULPABILITY ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
Mr. Fieeiki does not dispute that after being awakened by his wife 
on the night in question, who was hitting/kicking him (R. at 31, 41,60), he 
struck her three times (R. at 43, 60). 
The parties do not dispute that whatever happened on the night in 
question, happened only once, off duty, after hours, off premises and within the 
privacy of Mr. Fieeiki's home, with members of his own family, not involving 
any member of the public, not triggering any public awareness or media 
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notoriety (R. at 33, 46, 67). There is no need to marshal evidence in favor of 
this finding. Mr. Fieeiki does not dispute it, he accepts it. 
What he disagrees with is whether these acknowledged facts were 
culpable-were his off duty actions "in connection with employment" and were 
they "harmful to his employer's rightful interests"? Were such actions culpable? 
That seems to be a conclusion of law. 
Thus, where Mr. Fieeiki disagrees with the Board is in its 
application of the law of culpability to the acknowledged facts. And what is the 
law of culpability? 
The Board is correct that the Utah Administrative Rules do 
contain a rule (R 994-405-207) which does not limit conduct that may be 
disqualifying to offenses which take place only during business hours or on the 
employer's premises. The Rule sets forth various factors which a Court is to 
consider in evaluating whether misconduct which occurs off duty and off site 
has a sufficient connection to the employee's employment to nevertheless be 
culpable (harmful to the employer's rightful interests). These factors include: 
1. The offense must be something that is a subject of 
legitimate concern to the employer; or 
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2. The offense must be something that is a subject of 
significant concern to the employer; and 
3. The acts must be something that would be 
detrimental to the employer's business; or 
4. The acts must be something that would bring 
dishonor to the employer's business. 
The Rule then lists several examples of what interests may be 
interests of legitimate and significant concern to an employer, such as honesty, 
trust, discipline, efficiency, employee morale and good will. 
The employer bears the burden of proving that the employee's 
actions involved such interests and that the employee's actions destroyed or 
jeopardized such interests. Dept. of the Air Force v. Dept. of Employment 
Security, 786 P.2d 1361 and companion case at 786 P.2d 1366 (Utah App. 
1990). 
During the hearing before the Administrative Law Judge and in 
the appeal to the Workforce Appeals Board, the Department of Public Safety 
made several general allegations but offered little proof that Mr. Fieeiki's 
actions involved or jeopardized any such interests. I explain: 
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The Department of Public Safety called one witness, Fred Baird, 
who was not Mr. Fieeiki's supervisor, who testified that he had investigated 
hundreds of acts of misconduct involving police officers. R. at 36, lines 17-18. 
This agent testified that he had dealt with many officers against whom criminal 
charges had been filed. He testified that the Department had terminated many of 
such officers. R. at 36, lines 25-27. Apparently, the Department had not 
terminated all of such officers. The Department of Public Safety representative 
offered no testimony as to in how many of these terminations the Department 
had been able to establish that the criminal acts were on duty or off duty or in 
how many cases the Department had been able to establish that off duty 
misconduct satisfied the nin connection with employment aspect" of the 
culpability element of the just cause standard and, thus, thwart applications for 
unemployment insurance. Indeed, the Department of Public Safety witness 
testified he had not been involved in a case of domestic abuse with a child, R. at 
35, lines 30-31. Other than establishing that Mr. Fieeiki's actions violated some 
Departmental policies, a fact not in dispute, R. at 35, lines 9-16, the Department 
witness did not articulate, much less prove, why the Department chose to 
impose the disciplinary sanction of termination instead of some less severe 
punishment and how Mr. Fieeiki's actions impaired any of the Department's 
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rightful interests. The Department did not offer any testimony from any fellow 
coworker. The Department did not offer any testimony from any supervisor. 
The Department did not offer any testimony from any manager. The 
Department did not offer any testimony from any administrator. The 
Department did not offer any evidence of any media report about Mr. Fieeiki's 
actions which might have been embarrassing to the Department. The 
Department did not offer any testimony from a member of the general public 
that its impression of the Department had been lowered by some public 
disclosure of Mr. Fieeiki's actions (which was never made). R. at 33, 46, 67. 
The Department offered little evidence that Mr. Fieeiki's off duty 
actions jeopardized any of its rightful interests. Instead, the Department tried to 
rely on what it apparently believed was the self evident serious nature of the 
actions: 
STATEMENT 
"The conduct for which 
claimant was discharged 
was certainly connected 
with his work and of 
significant concern to his 
employer" (Respondent's 
brief at page 8) 
EMPLOYER'S 
EVIDENCE 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 




No testimony from any 
Department 
representative, other than 
the investigator. 
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"Violation of the law by 
one charged with 
upholding the law is a 
subject of legitimate and 
significant concern" to the 
employer" (Respondent's 
brief at page 8) 
"When claimant purposely 
violated the laws of the 
State of Utah, he showed a 
blatant disregard for the 
employer's rightful 
interests" (Respondent's 
brief at page 8) 
"The employer's trust was 
breached" (Respondent's 
brief at page 8) 
"The employment 
relationship [was] so 
seriously damaged as to 
make termination 
inevitable and justifiable" 
(Respondent's brief at 
page 8) 
"The claimant's actions 
reflected poorly on the 
Department of Public 
Safety" (Respondent's 
brief at page 9) 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 
Department policies. R. at 
32. 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 
Department policies. R. at 
32. 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 
Department policies. R. at 
32. 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 
Department policies. R. at 
32. 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 
Department policies. R. at 
32. 
No testimony from any 
Department 
representative, other than 
the investigator. 
No testimony from any 
Department 
representative, other than 
the investigator. 
No testimony from any 
Department 
representative, other than 
the investigator. 
No testimony from any 
Department supervisor, 
manager or administrator. 
No public disclosure. No 
testimony from any public 
or media representative. 
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"The claimant's actions 
were sufficiently serious 
to involve the degree of 
culpability required by 
statute" (Respondent's 
brief at page 9) 
"The employer established 
by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the claimant 
engaged in culpable 
conduct that required his 
termination" 
(Respondent's brief at 
page 9) 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 
Department policies. R. at 
32. 
Lt. Baird's testimony that 
Mr. Fieeiki's actions 
violated several 




And see, for example, the Department's arguments in its brief in opposition 
dealing with the element of knowledge. "He...knew or should have known that 
assault and domestic violence would be a matter of serious concern to his 
employer and could lead to his termination," Respondent's brief at 9, and "The 
Claimant knew that breaking the law and violating the Department of Public 
Safety's policy was adverse to his employer's interests." Respondent's brief at 
11. 
The Board makes all these conclusory statements but offers little 
specific proof from any witness competent to testify about such interests. To 
make the point even more precisely, consider the particular interests the 
Administrative Rule lists and examine the Department's evidence: 
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Honesty. The Department adduced no evidence that Mr. 
Fieeiki's actions involved dishonesty. The acts themselves did not 
involve an act of dishonesty. Mr. Fieeiki did not lie about his actions. 
He was straight forward about what happened. Mr. Fieeiki did not steal 
anything. He did not engage in any act of sexual immorality. 
Trust. The Department adduced no evidence that because 
of Mr. Fieeiki's actions in an incident in his bedroom with his wife in the 
middle of the night, it could no longer trust Mr. Fieeiki. The Department 
adduced no evidence that the conduct was anything other than an isolated 
incident of poor judgment with no expectation that it would be continued 
or repeated. See Utah Administrative Rule 994-405-202. The 
Department adduced no evidence that Mr. Fieeiki did not have an 
established pattern of complying with the employer's rules so that this 
incident would likely not be repeated. See Utah Administrative Rule 
994-405-202. 
Discipline. The Department adduced no evidence that Mr. 
Fieeiki's actions disrupted or impaired the ability of the Department to 
maintain discipline among its employees. Indeed, the Department 
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adduced no evidence that any employees other than those in Mr. Fieeiki's 
immediate chain of command even knew about his actions. 
Efficiency. The Department adduced no evidence that Mr. 
Fieeiki's conduct (or his retention) would have impacted the efficiency of 
Mr. Fieeiki in doing his job or the Department in performing its mission. 
Employee Morale. The Department adduced no evidence 
that Mr. Fieeiki's conduct (or his retention) would have had any impact 
on the morale of Department employees. 
Goodwill. The Department adduced no evidence that Mr. 
Fieeiki's actions cost the Department any goodwill. What we do know is 
that the officers who arrested the claimant came to his house in the 
middle of the night right after the events had occurred. Those police 
officers notified the employee's supervisor. That supervisor passed 
information onto Mr. Fieeiki's ultimate supervisor, the Commissioner of 
Public Safety. That was the only "public" which knew of the incident. 
There was no showing that the public became aware of what had 
occurred during the approximate 10 seconds in his bedroom on the night 
in question or that the public became aware of Mr. Fieeiki's arrest or 
charges. There was no showing that even if the public did become aware 
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of Mr. Fieeiki's misconduct, such lowered the image of the Department 
in their eyes. 
In the instant case, the employer's evidence on how Mr. Fieeiki's off 
duty misconduct jeopardized his employer's interests did fall short of the mark. 
As precedent, the Board cites to Clearfield v. Department of 
Employment Security, 663 P.2d 440 (Utah 1983). See Respondent's brief at 
pages 8 and 9. The crime in Clearfield involved clearly serious criminal 
conduct after hours and off premises. But the crime involved was sodomy, a 
sexual offense involving a non-family member, and public notoriety. And the 
officer in question was less than forthcoming about his misconduct. Based on 
the evidence presented, the Department found such actions (sodomy and 
mendacity) act had a serious adverse effect on the claimant's employer's rightful 
interests. This negative effect included (1) disabling the employee from 
continued effectiveness as a police officer; and (2) discrediting the police 
department and his ultimate employer, the City. 
By contrast, in the instant case, Mr. Fieeiki's off duty, off site 
actions did not involve sexual immorality or lying, did not involve non-family 
members or any member of the public. They did not involve the use of a 
firearm. They did not involve alcohol or drugs. They did not involve injuries. 
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R. at 32. They did not involve any public notoriety. Did the Department 
adduce evidence that Mr. Fieeiki's off duty misconduct rendered him ineffective 
in his job or discredited his employer? No. Did the Department of Public 
Safety's evidence establish that Mr. Fieeiki's off duty conduct seriously 
impaired the interests Mr. Fieeiki was employed to further? No. The 
Department offered no evidence that Mr. Fieeiki's off duty actions jeopardized 
any legitimate interest of the Department. Speculation is not evidence. Fear of 
some remote harm is not evidence. The "fatal flaw" in the Department's 
evidence is not in its evidence as to what Mr. Fieeiki did. That is not in dispute. 
The fatal flaw is in its lack of evidence as to what Mr. Fieeiki's actions did to 
harm the Department's public image. 
POINT II. THE BOARD DID NOT PROPERLY APPLY 
THE LAW TO THE FACTS. 
Mr. Fieeiki is not trying to justify domestic violence in any form 
or deny that he did something morally and legally wrong. He did. Mr. Fieeiki 
became involved in an unfortunate incident with his wife in their bedroom, 
having no connection to his job. The issue is not whether he could have been or 
should have been fired. He did violate certain Department policies and the 
Department was justified in imposing some level of discipline. But the issue is 
whether his employer has adduced sufficient evidence to prove that his off duty 
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misconduct had some connection to this employment by exposing the 
Department of Public Safety to a serious threat of actual or potential harm. Mr. 
Fieeiki contends the evidence on these issues is lacking. Platitudes about self 
evident propositions are not evidence. 
That the Department would discharge Mr. Fieeiki for such an act 
is not the issue in the instant appeal. What is at issue is whether Mr. Fieeiki5s 
single off duty, off premises act was so culpable that he should be denied 
unemployment insurance benefits. 
Thus, Mr. Fieeiki's concerns with the decision are, in reality, two fold: 
1. There is little evidence to sustain a finding that Mr. 
Fieeiki's actions were culpable, as that term is defined by 
the Utah Employment Security Act and implementing 
regulations; and 
2. Even if there was evidence to support a conclusion of some 
culpability, culpability is always a matter of degree and the 
level of culpability in the instant case does not justify 
denying Mr. Fieeiki eligibility for unemployment insurance 
benefits. 
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Most people who get fired have done something wrong on the job . 
But that does not mean they do not qualify for unemployment. Most do. City of 
Orem v. Christensen. 682 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984), Martin v. Dept. of 
Employment Security. 682 P.2d 304 (Utah 1984), Logan Regional Hospital v. 
Board of Review. 723 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986), Lane v. Board of Review . 727 
P.2d 206 (Utah 1986). In some cases, on duty misconduct is so serious that the 
Court has upheld denial of benefits. See Rahimi v. Board of Review. 706 P.2d 
1063 (Utah 1985), Grinnell v. Board of Review. 732 P.2d 113 (Utah 1987), 
Stegen v. Dept. of Emp. Sec. 751 P.2d 1160 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), Law Offices 
of David Paul White v. Board of Review. 778 P.2d 21 (Utah Ct. App. 1980), 
Nelson v. Dept. of Emp. Sec, 801 P.2d 158 (Utah App. 1990), Bhatia v. Dept. 
of Emp. Sec. 834 P.2d 574 (Utah App. 1992). 
The issue, especially where the employee has done something 
wrong off the job, is always one of degree-is there any connection with the 
employee's employment and how "wrong" were the employee's actions? That 
is a matter of applying the law to the facts. Wright's Furniture Mill v. Industrial 
Commission. 707 P.2d 113 (Utah 1985). 
The incident in the instant case involved some physical contact 
between husband and wife. It did not involve sex or money or drugs. Cf 
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Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Sec. 782 P.2d 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). It did not 
involve a member of the public. It happened in the middle of the night. It 
engendered no public notoriety. It was a first offense. It was an isolated error 
in discretion/judgment. It should not be disqualifying. Northwest Foods Ltd. v. 
Board of Review. 731 P.2d 470 (Utah 1986). 
The Department of Public Safety may hold police officers to a 
higher standard. It may discipline, even terminate, employees who do 
something off duty and off site which violates Department policies. But if a law 
enforcement officer falls short of the standard on one occasion and gets fired, 
the Department still has to prove why and how such misconduct, especially off 
duty misconduct, jeopardized its rightful interests in order to deny eligibility for 
unemployment insurance benefits. It may be that a law enforcement officer's 
off duty misconduct may discredit a law enforcement agency. But the 
Department has to offer some evidence to that effect and prove that proposition. 
See, generally, Spartan AMC/Jeep v. Board of Review. 709 P.2d 395 (Utah 
1985), Pro Benefit Staffing. Inc. v. Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). In the instant case, the meager proof offered did not support a 
conclusion of culpability. The Department's factual evidence did not establish 
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culpability. The Board's decision on the application of the law of culpability to 
the facts was erroneous and an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The practical impact of the Board's decision is to adopt a per se rule that 
any off duty misconduct by a police officer satisfies the "in connection with 
employment" rule and the element of culpability and, thus, satisfies the elements of just 
cause. 
Mr. Fieeiki believes the Court should avoid adopting such a rule for two 
reasons: (1) a per se rule would abdicate judicial responsibility of determining fact 
intensive cases on a case-by-case basis, Continental Oil Co. v. Board of Review, 568 
P.2d 727 (Utah 1977) (culpability requires a finding of a deliberate, wilful or wanton 
disregard by the employee of the interests of his employer); and (2) would emasculate 
protection to employees who have engaged in some act of off duty misconduct with 
little or no connection to their employment and render them without the protections of 
the unemployment insurance safety net. Martin v. Dept. of Emp. Sec, 682 P.2d 304 
(Utah 1984). 
Mr. Fieeiki urges the Court to reverse the denial of unemployment 
insurance benefits. 
18 
DATED this i s ^ / d a y of April, 2005. 
David J. Holdsworth 
Attorney for Petitioner Stanley B. Fieeiki 
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Michael Medley, Esq. 
Workforce Appeals Board 
Department of Workforce Services 
140 East 300 South 
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Salt Lake City UT 84145-0244 
David J. Holdsworth 
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